Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important subclass of theirs (the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute, in exponential time, the optimal values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called reset-acyclic priced timed games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock).
Introduction
The importance of models inspired from the field of game theory is nowadays well-established in theoretical computer science. They allow to describe and analyse the possible interactions of antagonistic agents (or players) as in the controller synthesis problem, for instance. This problem asks, given a model of the environment of a system, and of the possible actions of a controller, to compute a controller that constraints the environment to respect a given specification. Clearly, one can not, in general, assume that the two players (the environment and the controller) will collaborate, hence the need to find a controller strategy that enforces the specification whatever the environment does. This question thus reduces to computing a so-called winning strategy for the corresponding player in the game model. In order to describe precisely the features of complex computer systems, several game models have been considered in the literature. In this work, we focus on the model of Priced Timed Games [16] (PTGs for short), which can be regarded as an extension (in several directions) of classical finite automata. First, like timed automata [2] , PTGs have clocks, which are real-valued variables whose values evolve with time elapsing, and which can be tested and reset along the transitions. Second, the locations are associated with price-rates and transitions are labeled by discrete prices, as in priced timed automata [4, 3, 6] . These prices allow one to associate a cost with all runs (or plays), which depends on the sequence of transitions traversed by the run, and on the time spent in each visited location. Finally, a PTG is played by two players, called Min and Max, and each location of the game is owned by either of them (we consider a turn-based version of the game). The player who controls the current location decides how long to wait, and which transition to take.
In this setting, the goal of Min is to reach a given set of target locations, following a play whose cost is as small as possible. Player Max has an antagonistic objective: he tries to avoid the target locations, and, if not possible, to maximise the accumulated cost up to the first visit of a target location. To reflect these objectives, we define the upper value Val of the game as a mapping of the configurations of the PTG to the least cost that Min can guarantee while reaching the target, whatever the choices of Max. Similarly, the lower value Val returns the greatest cost that Max can ensure (letting the cost being +∞ in case the target locations are not reached).
An example of PTG is given in Figure 1 , where the locations of Min (respectively, Max) are represented by circles (respectively, rectangles), and the integers next to the locations are their price-rates, i.e., the cost of spending one time unit in the location. Moreover, there is only one clock x in the game, which is never reset and all guards on transitions are x ∈ [0, 1] (hence this guard is not displayed and transitions are only labeled by their respective discrete cost): this is an example of simple priced timed game, as we will define them properly later. It is easy to check that Min can force reaching the target location f from all configurations ( , ν) of the game, where is a location and ν is a real valuation of the clock in [0, 1] . Let us comment on the optimal strategies for both players. From a configuration ( 4 , ν), with ν ∈ [0, 1], Max better waits until the clock takes value 1, before taking the transition to f (he is forced to move, by the rule of the game). Hence, Max's optimal value is 3(1 − ν) − 7 = −3ν − 4 from all configurations ( 4 , ν). Symmetrically, it is easy to check that Min better waits as long as possible in 7 , hence his optimal value is −16(1 − ν) from all configurations ( 7 , ν). However, optimal value functions are not always that simple, see for instance the lower value function of 1 on the right of Figure 1 , which is a piecewise affine function. To understand why value functions can be piecewise affine, consider the sub-game enclosed in the dotted rectangle in Figure 1 , and consider the value that Min can guarantee from a configuration of the form ( 3 , ν) in this sub-game. Clearly, Min must decide how long he will spend in 3 and whether he will go to 4 or 7 . His optimal value from all ( 3 , ν) is thus inf 0 t 1−ν min 4t + (−3(ν + t) − 4), 4t + 6 − 16(1 − (ν + t)) = min(−3ν − 4, 16ν − 10). Since 16ν − 10 −3ν − 4 if and only if ν 6/19, the best choice of Min is to move instantaneously to 7 if ν ∈ [0, 6/19] and to move instantaneously to 4 if ν ∈ (6/19, 1], hence the value function of 3 (in the subgame) is a piecewise affine function with two pieces. guards, for instance x 5 instead of [0, 5] . Let S ⊆ Guard(x) be a finite set of guards. We let [[S] ] = I∈S I. Assuming M 0 = 0 < M 1 < · · · < M k are all the endpoints of the intervals in S (to which we add 0), we let Reg S = {(M i , M i+1 ) | 0 i k − 1} ∪ {{M i } | 0 i k} be the set of regions of S. Observe that Reg S is also a set of guards.
We rely on the notion of cost function to formalise the notion of optimal value function sketched in the introduction. Formally, for a set of guards S ⊆ Guard(x), a cost function over S is a function f : [[Reg S ]] → R = R ∪ {+∞, −∞} such that over all regions r ∈ Reg S , f is either infinite or a continuous piecewise affine function, with a finite set of cutpoints (points where the first derivative is not defined) {κ 1 , . . . , κ p } ⊆ Q, and with f (κ i ) ∈ Q for all 1 i p. In particular, if f (r) = {f (ν) | ν ∈ r} contains +∞ (respectively, −∞) for some region r, then f (r) = {+∞} (f (r) = {−∞}). We denote by CF S the set of all cost functions over S. In our algorithm to solve SPTGs, we will need to combine cost functions thanks to the operator. Let f ∈ CF S and f ∈ CF S be two costs functions on set of guards S, S ⊆ Guard(x), such that [[S] ] ∩ [ [S ] ] is a singleton. We let f f be the cost function in CF S∪S such that (f f )(ν) = f (ν) for all ν ∈ [[Reg S ]], and (f f )(ν) = f (ν) for all
We consider an extended notion of one-clock priced timed games (PTGs for short) allowing for the use of urgent locations, where only a zero delay can be spent, and final cost functions which are associated with each final location and incur an extra cost to be paid when ending the game in this location.
where L Min (respectively, L Max ) is a finite set of locations for player Min (respectively, Max), with L Min ∩ L Max = ∅; L f is a finite set of final locations, and we let
is a finite set of transitions; ϕ = (ϕ ) ∈L f associates to each ∈ L f its final cost function, that is an affine 2 cost function ϕ over S G = {I | ∃ , R, : ( , I, R, ) ∈ ∆}; π : L ∪ ∆ → Z mapping an integer price to each location-its price-rate-and transition.
Intuitively, a transition ( , I, R, ) changes the current location from to if the clock has value in I and the clock is reset according to the Boolean R. We assume that, in all PTGs, the clock x is bounded, i.e., there is M ∈ N such that for all guards I ∈ S G , I ⊆ [0, M ].
3
We denote by Reg G the set Reg S G of regions of G. We further denote 4 by Π Let
We denote by Conf G the set of configurations of G. Let ( , ν) and ( , ν ) be two configurations. Let δ = ( , I, R, ) ∈ ∆ be a transition of G and t ∈ R + be a delay. Then, there is a (t, δ)-transition from ( , ν) to ( , ν ) with cost c, denoted by ( , ν)
Observe that the cost of (t, δ) takes into account the price-rate of , the delay spent in , and the price of δ. We assume that 1 Here we differ from [10] where Lu ⊆ L Max . 2 The affine restriction on final cost function is to simplify our further arguments, though we do believe that all of our results could be adapted to cope with general cost functions. 3 Observe that this last restriction is not without loss of generality in the case of PTGs. While all timed automata A can be turned into an equivalent (with respect to reachability properties) A whose clocks are bounded [4] , this technique can not be applied to PTGs, in particular with arbitrary prices. 4 Throughout the paper, we often drop the G in the subscript of several notations when the game is clear from the context. 
2 ) · · · , we let |ρ| be the least position i such that i ∈ L f if such a position exists, and |ρ| = +∞ otherwise. Then, we let Cost G (ρ) be the cost of ρ, with Cost G (ρ) = +∞ if |ρ| = +∞, and Cost G (ρ) = |ρ|−1 i=0 c i + ϕ |ρ| (ν |ρ| ) otherwise. A strategy for player Min is a function σ Min mapping every finite play ending in location of Min to a pair (t, δ) ∈ R + × ∆, indicating what Min should play. We also request that the strategy proposes only valid pairs (t, δ), i.e., that for all runs ρ ending in ( , ν), σ Min (ρ) = (t, ( , I, R, )) implies that ν + t ∈ I. Strategies σ Max of player Max are defined accordingly. We let Strat Min (G) and Strat Max (G) be the sets of strategies of Min and Max, respectively. A pair of strategies (σ Min , σ Max ) ∈ Strat Min (G) × Strat Max (G) is called a profile of strategies. Together with an initial configuration s 0 = ( 0 , ν 0 ), it defines a unique play 
We let Play(σ Min ) (respectively, Play(s 0 , σ Min )) be the set of plays that conform with σ Min (and start in s 0 ).
As sketched in the introduction, we consider optimal reachability-cost games on PTGs, where the aim of player Min is to reach a location of L f while minimising the cost. To formalise this objective, we let the value of a strategy σ Min for Min be the function Val 
, σ Min ensures that the cost of the plays will be at most
Properties of the value. Let us now prove useful preliminary properties of the value function of PTGs, that-as far as we know-had hitherto never been established. Using a general determinacy result by Gale and Stewart [14] , we can show that PTGs (with one clock) are determined. Hence, the value function Val G exists for all PTG G. We can further show that, for all locations , Val G ( ) is a piecewise continuous function that might exhibit discontinuities only on the borders of the regions of Reg G (where Val G ( ) is the function such that
. See Appendix A for detailed proofs of these results. The continuity holds only in the case of PTGs with a single clock. An example with two clocks and a value function exhibiting discontinuities inside a region is in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. For all (one-clock) PTGs
e., PTGs are determined; and (ii) for all r ∈ Reg G , for all ∈ L, Val G ( ) is either infinite or continuous over r.
Simple priced timed games. As sketched in the introduction, our main contribution is to solve the special case of simple one-clock priced timed games with arbitrary costs. Formally, an r-SPTG,
such that for all transitions ( , I, R, ) ∈ ∆, I = [0, r] and R = ⊥. Hence, transitions of r-SPTGs are henceforth denoted by ( , ), dropping the guard and the reset. Then, an SPTG is a 1-SPTG. This paper is devoted mainly to proving the following theorem on SPTGs: Before sketching the proof of this theorem, we discuss a class of (simple) strategies that are sufficient to play optimally. Roughly speaking, Max has always a memoryless optimal strategy, while Min might need (finite) memory to play optimally-it is already the case in untimed quantitative reachability games with arbitrary weights (see Appendix C). Moreover, these strategies are finitely representable (recall that even a memoryless strategy depends on the current configuration and that there are infinitely many in our time setting).
We formalise Max's strategies with the notion of finite positional strategy (FP-strategy): they are memoryless strategies σ (i.e., for all finite plays ρ 1 = ρ 1 c1 − → s and ρ 2 = ρ 2 c2 − → s ending in the same configuration, we have σ(ρ 1 ) = σ(ρ 2 )), such that for all locations , there exists a finite sequence of rationals 0 ν 1 < ν 2 < · · · < ν k = 1 and a finite sequence of transitions
. We let pts(σ) be the set of ν i for all and i, and int(σ) be the set of all successive intervals generated by pts(σ). Finally, we let |σ| = |int(σ)| be the size of σ. Intuitively, in an interval (ν i−1 , ν i ], σ always returns the same move: either to take immediately δ i or to wait until the clock reaches the endpoint ν i and then take δ i .
Min, however may require memory to play optimally. Informally, we will compute optimal switching strategies, as introduced in [12] (in the untimed setting). A switching strategy is described by a pair (σ 
∈ Play(σ Min ) with 1 = k , and ν, ν in the same interval of int(σ Min ), the sum of prices of discrete transitions is at most −1, i.e.,
Min must allow Min to reach a cost which is small enough, without necessarily reaching a target state, we define the fake value of an NC-strategy σ Min from a configuration s as fake σ Min G (s) = sup{Cost(ρ) | ρ ∈ Play(s, σ Min ), ρ reaches a target}, i.e., the value obtained when ignoring the σ Min -induced plays that do not reach the target. Thus, clearly, fake
We say that an NC-strategy is fake-optimal if its fake value, in every configuration, is equal to the optimal value of the configuration in the game. This is justified by the following result whose proof relies on the switching strategies described before (see a detailed proof in Appendix D): Then, an SPTG is called finitely optimal if (i) Min has a fake-optimal NC-strategy; (ii) Max has an optimal FP-strategy; and (iii) Val G ( ) is a cost function, for all locations . The central point in establishing Theorem 2 will thus be to prove that all SPTGs are finitely optimal, as this guarantees the existence of well-behaved optimal strategies and value functions. We will also show that they can be computed in exponential time. The proof is by induction on the number of urgent locations of the SPTG. In Section 3, we address the base case of SPTGs with urgent locations only (where no time can elapse). Since these SPTGs are very close to the untimed min-cost reachability games of [12] , we adapt the algorithm in this work and obtain the solveInstant function (Algorithm 1). This function can also compute Val G ( , 1) for all and all games G (even with non-urgent locations) since time can not elapse anymore when the clock has valuation 1. Next, using the continuity result of Theorem 1, we can detect locations where Val G ( , ν) ∈ {+∞, −∞}, for all ν ∈ [0, 1], and remove them from the game. Finally, in Section 4 we handle SPTGs with non-urgent locations by refining the technique of [10, 17] (that work only on SPTGs with non-negative costs). Compared to [10, 17] , our algorithm is simpler, being iterative, instead of recursive.
SPTGs with only urgent locations
Throughout this section, we consider an Min ) with a threshold K (as described in the previous section). Now let us explain how we can reduce the computation of Val G ( ) : ν ∈ [0, r] → Val( , ν) (for all ) to a finite number of calls to solveInstant. Let F G be the set of affine functions over [0, r] 
2 points (also a pseudo-polynomial in the size of G) since all functions in F G are affine, and can thus intersect at most once with every other function. Moreover, PossCP G ⊆ Q, since all functions of F G take rational values in 0 and r ∈ Q. Thus, for all , Val G ( ) is a cost function (with cutpoints in PossCP G and pieces from F G ). Since Val G ( ) is a piecewise affine function, we can characterise it completely by computing only its value on its cutpoints. Hence, we can reconstruct Val G ( ) by calling solveInstant on each rational valuation ν ∈ PossCP G . From the optimal strategies computed along solveInstant [12], we can also reconstruct a fake-optimal NC-strategy for Min and an optimal FP-strategy for Max, hence: 
Solving general SPTGs
In this section, we consider SPTGs with possibly non-urgent locations. We first prove that all such SPTGs are finitely optimal. Then, we introduce Algorithm 2 to compute optimal values and strategies of SPTGs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to solve SPTGs with arbitrary weights. Throughout the section, we fix an 
The G L ,r construction. To prove finite optimality of SPTGs and to establish correctness of our algorithm, we rely in both cases on a construction that consists in decomposing G into a sequence of SPTGs with more urgent locations. Intuitively, a game with more urgent locations is easier to solve since it is closer to an untimed game (in particular, when all locations are urgent, we can apply the techniques of Section 3). More precisely, given a set L of non-urgent locations, and a valuation r 0 ∈ [0, 1], we will define a (possibly infinite)
, except that the locations of L are now urgent; and (ii) for all i 0, the value function of G L ,ri is equal to Val G on the interval [r i+1 , r i ]. Hence, we can re-construct Val G by assembling well-chosen parts of the values functions of the G L ,ri (assuming inf i r i = 0). This basic result will be exploited in two directions. First, we prove by induction on the number of urgent locations that all SPTGs are finitely optimal, by re-constructing Val G (as well as optimal strategies) as a -concatenation of the value functions of a finite sequence of SPTGs with one more urgent locations. The base case, with only urgent locations, is solved by Proposition 4. This construction suggests a recursive algorithm in the spirit of [10, 17] (for non-negative prices). Second, we show that this recursion can be avoided (see Algorithm 2). Instead of turning locations urgent one at a time, this algorithm makes them all urgent and computes directly the sequence of SPTGs with only urgent locations. Its proof of correctness relies on the finite optimality of SPTGs and, again, on our basic result linking the values functions of G and games G L ,ri .
Let us formalise these constructions. Let G be an SPTG, let r ∈ [0, 1] be an endpoint, and let x = (x ) ∈L be a vector of rational values. Then, wait(G, r, x) is an r-SPTG in which both players may now decide, in all non-urgent locations , to wait until the clock takes value r, and then to stop the game, adding the cost x to the current cost of the play. Formally,
, and π (δ) = 0 otherwise. Then, we let G r = wait G, r, (Val G ( , r)) ∈L , i.e., the game obtained thanks to wait by letting x be the value of G in r. One can check that this first transformation does not alter the value of the game, for valuations before r: , ν) . Furthermore, fakeoptimal NC-strategies and optimal FP-strategies in G L ∪{ },r are also fake-optimal and optimal over [a, r] 
r is finitely optimal, and for all a ν
Given an SPTG G and some finitely optimal G L ,r , we now characterise precisely the left endpoint of the maximal interval ending in r where the value functions of G and G L ,r coincide, with the operator
By continuity of the value (Theorem 1), this supremum exists and
However, this definition of left(r) is semantical. Yet, building on the ideas of Proposition 5, we can effectively compute 
Figure 2 The condition (1) (in the case L = ∅ and ∈ L Min ): graphically, it means that the slope between any two points of the plot in [a, r] (represented with a thick line) is greater than or equal to −π( ) (represented with dashed line). by inspecting iteratively, for all of Min (respectively, Max), the slopes of Val G L ,r ( ), by decreasing valuations, until we find a piece with a slope > −π( ) (respectively, < −π( )). This enumeration of the slopes is effective as Val G L ,r has finitely many pieces, by hypothesis. Moreover, this guarantees that left(r) < r. Thus, one can reconstruct
for all i such that r i > 0, for all possible choices of non-urgent locations L . Next, we will define two different ways of choosing L : the former to prove finite optimality of all SPTGs, the latter to obtain an algorithm to solve them.
SPTGs are finitely optimal. To prove finite optimality of all SPTGs we reason by induction on the number of non-urgent locations and instantiate the previous results to the case where L = { } where is a non-urgent location of minimum price-rate (i.e., for all ∈ L, π( ) π( )). Given r 0 ∈ [0, 1], we let r 0 > r 1 > · · · be the decreasing sequence of valuations such that r i = left (r i−1 ) for all i > 0. As explained before, we will build Val G on [inf i r i , r 0 ] from the value functions of games G ,ri . Assuming finite optimality of those games, this will prove that G is finitely optimal under the condition that r 0 > r 1 > · · · eventually stops, i.e., r i = 0 for some i. This property is given by the next lemma, which ensures that, for all i, the owner of has a strictly better strategy in configuration ( , r i+1 ) than waiting until r i in location .
By iterating this construction, we make all locations urgent iteratively, and obtain:
Proposition 7. Every SPTG G is finitely optimal and for all locations ,
Proof. As announced, we show by induction on n 0 that every r-SPTG G with n nonurgent locations is finitely optimal, and that the number of cutpoints of
, which suffices to show the above bound, since
The base case n = 0 is given by Proposition 4. Now, assume that G has at least one non-urgent location, and consider one with minimum price. By induction hypothesis, all r -SPTGs G ,r are finitely optimal for all r ∈ [0, r]. Let r 0 > r 1 > · · · be the decreasing sequence defined by r 0 = r and r i = left (r i−1 ) for all i 1. By Lemma 6, there exists j |F G | 2 + 2 such that r j = 0. Moreover, for all 0 < i j,
) is a cost function on this interval, for all , and the number of cutpoints on this interval is bounded
by induction hypothesis (notice that maximal transition prices are the same in G and G ,ri−1 , but that we add n more final locations in G ,ri−1 ). Adding the cutpoint 1, summing over i from 0 to j |F G | 2 + 2, and observing that |F G | 2Π tr |L f |, we bound the number of cutpoints of
. Finally, we can reconstruct fake-optimal and optimal strategies in G from the from fake-optimal and optimal strategies of G ,ri .
Computing the value functions. The finite optimality of SPTGs allows us to compute the value functions. The proof of Proposition 7 suggests a recursive algorithm to do so: from an SPTG G with minimal non-urgent location , solve recursively (1)) , etc. handling the base case where all locations are urgent with Algorithm 1. While our results above show that this is correct and terminates, we propose instead to solve-without the need for recursion-the sequence of games G L\Lu,1 , G L\Lu,left(1) , . . . i.e., making all locations urgent at once. Again, the arguments given above prove that this scheme is correct, but the key argument of Lemma 6 that ensures termination can not be applied in this case. Instead, we rely on the following lemma, stating, that there will be at least one cutpoint of Val G in each interval [left(r), r]. Observe that this lemma relies on the fact that G is finitely optimal, hence the need to first prove this fact independently with the sequence (1)) ,. . . Termination then follows from the fact that Val G has finitely many cutpoints by finite optimality.
Algorithm 2 implements these ideas. Each iteration of the while loop computes a new game in the sequence G L\Lu,1 , G L\Lu,left(1) , . . . described above; solves it thanks to solveInstant; and thus computes a new portion of Val G on an interval on the left of the current point r ∈ [0, 1]. More precisely, the vector (Val G ( , 1)) ∈L is first computed in line 1. Then, the algorithm enters the while loop, and the game G obtained when reaching line 6 is G L\Lu,1 . Then, the algorithm enters the repeat loop to analyse this game. Instead of building the whole value function of G , Algorithm 2 builds only the parts of Val G that coincide with Val G . It proceeds by enumerating the possible cutpoints a of Val G , starting in r, by decreasing valuations (line 8), and computes the value of Val G in each cutpoint thanks to solveInstant (line 9), which yields a new piece of Val G . Then, the if in line 10 checks whether this new piece coincides with Val G , using the condition given by Proposition 5. If it is the case, the piece of Val G is added to f (line 11); repeat is stopped otherwise. When exiting the repeat loop, variable b has value left(1). Hence, at the next iteration of the while loop, G = G L\Lu,left(1) when reaching line 6. By continuing this reasoning inductively, one concludes that the successive iterations of the while loop compute the sequence G L\Lu,1 , G L\Lu, left(1) , . . . as announced, and rebuilds Val G from them. Termination in exponential time is ensured by Lemma 8: each iteration of the while loop discovers at least one new cutpoint of Val G , and there are at most exponentially many (note that a tighter bound on this number of cutpoints would entail a better complexity of our algorithm).
Example 9. Let us briefly sketch the execution of Algorithm 2 on the SPTG in Figure 1 . During the first iteration of the while loop, the algorithm computes the correct value functions until the cutpoint 3 4 : in the repeat loop, at first a = 9/10 but the slope in 1 is smaller than the slope that would be granted by waiting, as depicted in Figure 1 . Then, a = 3/4 where the algorithm gives a slope of value −16 in 2 while the cost of this location of Max is −14. During the first iteration of the while loop, the inner repeat loop thus ends with r = 3/4. The next iterations of the while loop end with r = 
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Beyond SPTGs
In [10, 17, 15] , general PTGs with non-negative prices are solved by reducing them to a finite sequence of SPTGs, by eliminating guards and resets. It is thus natural to try and adapt these techniques to our general case, in which case Algorithm 2 would allow us to solve general PTGs with arbitrary costs. Let us explain why it is not (completely) the case. The technique used to remove guards from PTGs consists in enhancing the locations with regions while keeping an equivalent game. This technique can be adapted to arbitrary weights, see Appendix H for a proof adapted from [15, Lemma 4.6]. The technique to handle resets, however, consists in bounding the number of clock resets that can occur in any play following an optimal strategy of Min or Max. Then, the PTG can be unfolded into a reset-acyclic PTG with the same value. By reset-acyclic, we mean that no cycle in the configuration graph visits a transition with a reset. This reset-acyclic PTG can be decomposed into a finite number of components that contain no reset and are linked by transitions with resets. These components can be solved iteratively, from the bottom to the top, turning them into SPTGs. Thus, if we assume that the PTGs we are given as input are reset-acyclic, we can solve them in exponential time, and show that their value functions are cost functions with at most exponentially many cutpoints, using our techniques (see Appendix H). Unfortunately, the arguments to bound the number of resets do not hold for arbitrary costs, as shown by the PTG in Figure 4 . We claim that Val( 0 ) = 0; that Min has no optimal strategy, but a family of ε-optimal strategies σ f . In the former case, the cost of the play will be −kε + 0 + ε = −(k − 1)ε ε; in the latter, −ε( 1/ε ) + 1 0. This shows that Val( 0 ) = 0, but there is no optimal strategy as none of these strategies allow one to guarantee a cost of 0 (neither does the strategy that waits 1 time unit in 0 ).
However, we may apply the result on reset-acyclic PTGs to obtain:
Theorem 10. The value functions of all one-clock PTGs are cost functions with at most exponentially many cutpoints.
Proof. Let G be a one-clock PTG. Let us replace all transitions ( , g, , ) resetting the clock by ( , g, ⊥, ) , where is a new final location with ϕ = Val G ( , 0)-observe that Val G ( , 0) exists even if we can not compute it, so this transformation is well-defined. This yields a reset-acyclic PTG G such that Val G = Val G . 
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for all configurations c. Fix a configuration c. We consider several cases:
Max has no winning strategy in the game Threshold (G, k) . Therefore, by determinacy of this game, Min has a winning strategy. Equivalently, for all k > Val G (c), there exists σ
Hence, by (3) and (2) Therefore, by determinacy, Min has a winning strategy σ
We then turn to the proof of continuity. Therefore, our goal is to show that for every location , region r ∈ Reg G and valuations ν and ν in r,
This is equivalent to showing
As those two equations are symmetric with respect to ν and ν , we only have to show either of them. We will thus focus on the latter, which, by using the upper value, can be reformulated as: for all strategies σ Min of Min, there exists a strategy σ Min such that
Note that this last equation is equivalent to say that there exists a function g mapping plays ρ from ( , ν ), consistent with σ Min (i.e., such that ρ = Play(( , ν ), σ Min , σ Max ) for some strategy σ Max of Max) to plays from ( , ν), consistent with σ Min , such that
Let r ∈ Reg G , ν, ν ∈ r and σ Min be a strategy of Min. We define σ Min and g by induction on the size of their arguments; more precisely, we define σ Min (ρ 1 ) and g(ρ 2 ) by induction on k, for all plays ρ 1 and ρ 2 from ( , ν ), consistent with σ Min of size k − 1 and k, respectively. We also show during this induction that for each play
(i) ρ and g(ρ ) have the same length, i.e., |ρ| = = k = |ρ |, (ii) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ν i and ν i are in the same region, i.e., there exists a region r ∈ Reg G such that
Notice that no property is required on the strategy σ Min for finite plays that do not start in ( , ν ). If k = 1, as there is no play of length 0, nothing has to be done to define σ Min . Moreover, in that case, ρ = ( , ν ) and g(ρ ) = ( , ν). Both plays have size 1, ν and ν are in the same region by hypothesis of the lemma, and Cost(ρ ) = Cost(g(ρ )) = 0, therefore all four properties are true.
Let us suppose now that the construction is done for a given k 1, and perform it for k + 1. We start with the construction of σ Min . To that extent, consider a play ρ = ( 1 , ν 1 )
, consistent with σ Min such that k is a location of player Min. Let t and δ be the choice of delay and transition made by σ Min on g(ρ ), i.e., σ Min (g(ρ )) = (t, δ). Then, we define σ Min (ρ ) = (t , δ) where t = max(0, ν k + t − ν k ). The delay t respects the guard of transition δ since either ν k + t = ν k + t or ν k ν k + t ν k , in which case ν k is in the same region as ν k + t since ν k and ν k are in the same region. This is illustrated in Figure 5 .
We now build the mapping g. Let ρ = ( 1 , ν 1 )
δ) be the delay and transition taken after ρ . Using the construction of g over plays of length k by induction, the play g(ρ
) = ( 1 , ν 1 ) c1 − → · · · c k−1 − −− → ( k , ν k ) (with ( 1 , ν 1 ) = ( ,
ν)) verifies properties (i), (ii) and (iii). If k is a location of Min and σ
Min (g(ρ )) = (t, δ), then g(ρ ) = g(ρ ) c k − → ( k+1 , ν k+1 )
is obtained by applying those choices on g(ρ )
. If k is a location of Max, the last valuation ν k+1 of g(ρ ) is rather obtained by choosing action (t, δ) verifying t = max(0, ν k + t − ν k ). Note that transition δ is allowed since both ν k + t and ν k + t are in the same region (for similar reasons as above).
By induction hypothesis |ρ | = |g(ρ )|, thus (i) holds, i.e., |ρ | = |g(ρ )|. Moreover, ν k+1 and ν k+1 are also in the same region as either they are equal to ν k + t and ν k + t , respectively, or δ contains a reset in which case ν k+1 = ν k+1 = 0 which proves (ii). To prove (iii), notice that we always have either
In all of these possibilities, we have |(ν k + t) − (ν k + t)| |ν k − ν k |. By noticing again that either ν k+1 = ν k + t and ν k+1 = ν k + t , or δ contains a reset in which case ν k+1 = ν k+1 = 0, we conclude the proof of (iii). We finally check property (iv). In both cases:
If δ contains no reset, let us prove that
Indeed, since t = ν k+1 − ν k and t = ν k+1 − ν k , we have |t − t| = |ν k+1 − ν k − (ν k+1 − ν k )|. Then, two cases are possible: either t = max(0, ν k + t − ν k ) or t = max(0, ν k + t − ν k ). So we have three different possibilities:
Otherwise, either t = 0 and t ν k − ν k , or t = 0 and t ν k − ν k . In all cases, we have proved (4). Coupled with the fact that |P ( k )| Π loc , we conclude that: Now that σ Min and g are defined (noticing that g is stable by prefix, we extend naturally its definition to infinite plays), notice that for all play ρ from ( , ν ) consistent with σ Min , either ρ does not reach a final location and its cost is +∞, but in this case g(ρ ) has also cost +∞; or ρ is finite. In this case let ν k be the clock valuation of its last configuration, and ν k be the clock valuation of the last configuration of g(ρ ). Combining (iii) and (iv) we have Cost(ρ ) Cost(g(ρ )) + Π loc |ν − ν | which concludes the proof.
B Non-continuity of the value function with more than one clock
Let us consider the example in Figure 6 (that we describe informally since we did not properly define games with multiple clocks), with clocks x and y. One can easily check that, starting from a configuration ( − −−−−− → ( 0 , 0, 0.6) with cost −1. Hence, Val( 0 , 0, 0.6) = −∞, and the function is not continuous although both valuations (0, 0.5) and (0, 0.6) are in the same region. Observe that this holds even for priced timed automata, since our example requires only one player.
C Memory is required for Min to play optimally
As an example, consider the SPTG of Figure 7 , where W is a positive integer, and every location has pricerate 0: hence, this game can be seen as an (untimed) min-cost reachability game as studied in [12] , where it has been initially studied. We claim that the values of locations 1 and 2 are both −W . Indeed, consider the following strategy for Min: during each of the first W visits to 2 (if any), go to 1 ; else, go to f . Clearly, this strategy ensures that the final location f will eventually be reached, and that either (i) transition ( 1 , 3 ) (with weight −W ) will eventually be traversed; or (ii) transition ( 1 , 2 ) (with weight −1) will be traversed at least W times. Hence, in all plays following this strategy, the cost will be at most −W . This strategy allows Min to secure −W , but he can not ensure a lower cost, since Max always has the opportunity to take the transition ( 1 , f ) (with weight −W ) instead of cycling between 1 and 2 . Hence, Max's optimal choice is to follow the transition ( 1 , f ) as soon as 1 is reached, securing a cost of −W . The Min strategy we have just given is optimal, and there is no optimal memoryless strategy for Min. Indeed, always playing ( 2 , f ) does not ensure a cost at most −W ; and, always playing ( 2 , 1 ) does not guarantee to reach the target, and this strategy has thus value +∞.
D Fake-optimality: proof of Lemma 3
First of all, notice that all finite plays ρ ∈ Play(σ Min ) with all clock valuations in the same interval I of int(σ) verify Cost(ρ) |I|Π loc + |L|Π tr − |ρ|/|L|. Indeed, the cost of ρ is the sum of the cost generated by staying in locations, which is bounded by |I|Π loc , and the cost of the transitions. One can extract at least |ρ|/|L| cycles with transition prices as most −1 (by definition of an NC-strategy), and what remains is of size at most |L|, ensuring that the transition cost is bounded by |L|Π tr − |ρ|/|L|.
Then, by splitting runs among intervals of int(σ Min ), we can easily obtain that all finite plays ρ ∈ Play(σ Min ) verify Cost(ρ) 
We now turn to the proof of the lemma. To that extent, we suppose known an attractor strategy for Min, i.e., a strategy that ensures to reach a final location: it exists thanks to the hypothesis on the finiteness of the values. From every configuration, it reaches a final location with a cost bounded above by a given constant M . Notice first that, with the hypothesis that no configuration has a value −∞ in the SPTG we consider, it is not possible that fake σ Min G (s) = −∞ for a configuration s (i.e., that no runs of Play(s, σ Min ) reach the target). Indeed, consider the strategy σ Min obtained by playing σ Min until having computed a cost bounded above by a fixed integer N ∈ Z, in which case we switch to the attractor strategy. By the previous inequality, the switch is sure to happen since the right term tends to −∞ when the length of ρ tends to ∞. Then, we know that the value guaranteed by σ Min is at most N , implying that the optimal value Val(s) is −∞, which contradicts the hypothesis. Then, to prove the result of the lemma, consider the strategy σ Min obtained by playing σ Min until having computed a cost bounded above by the finite value fake σ Min G (s) − M , in which case we switch to the attractor strategy. Once again, the switch is sure to happen, implying that every play conforming to σ Min reaches the target: moreover, the cost of such a play is necessarily at most fake σ Min (s) by construction. Then,
we directly obtain that Val
E SPTGs with only urgent locations: extended version of Section 3
We rely on the proofs of [12] that can easily be adapted in our case, even though we must give the whole explanation here, knowing that prices coming from goal functions can be rational, and hence do not strictly fall in the framework of [12] .
Since all locations in G are urgent, we may extract from a play ρ = ( 0 , ν)
− → · · · the clock valuations, as well as prices c i = π( i , i+1 ), hence denoting plays by their sequence of locations 0 1 · · · . The cost of this play is
E.1 Computing the value for a particular valuation
Let us show how to compute the vector Val ν = (Val( , ν) ) ∈L , for a given ν ∈ [0, r], in terms of a sequence of values. Following the arguments of [12], we first observe that locations with values Val ν ( ) = +∞ and Val ν ( ) = −∞ can be pre-computed (using respectively attractor and mean-payoff techniques) and removed from the game without changing the values of the other nodes. Then, because of the particular structure of the game G (where a real cost is paid only on the target location, all other prices being integers), for all plays ρ, Cost(ρ) is a value from the set
Then, we define an operator
We will obtain Val ν as the limit of the sequence ( −1) ) for i 0. The intuition behind is that x i is the value of the game (when the clock takes value ν) if we impose that Min must reach the target within i steps (and get a payoff of +∞ if it fails to do so). Formally, for a play The next step is to show that the values that can be computed along the sequence (still assuming that Val ν ( ) is finite for all ) are taken from a finite set:
Lemma 13. For all i 0 and for all ∈ L:
where PossVal ν has cardinality bounded by |L f | × (2|L| − 1)Π tr + 2Π fin + 1 .
Proof. Following the proof of [12, Lemma 3]
, it is easy to show that if Min can secure, from some vertex , a cost less than −(|L| − 1)Π tr − Π fin , i.e., Val( , ν) < −(|L| − 1)Π tr − Π fin , then it can secure an arbitrarily small cost from that configuration, i.e., Val( , ν) = −∞, which contradicts our hypothesis that the value is finite.
Hence, for all i 0, for all :
By Lemma 12 and since the sequence is non-increasing, we conclude that, for all i 0 and for all ∈ L:
Since all Val |L|+i ( ) are also in Z ν,ϕ , we conclude that Val |L|+i ( ) ∈ PossVal ν for all i 0. The upper bound on the size of PossVal ν is established by (5).
This allows us to bound the number of iterations needed for the sequence to stabilise. The worst case is where all locations are assigned a value bounded below by −(|L| − 1)Π tr − Π fin from the highest possible value where all vertices are assigned a value bounded above by |L|Π tr + Π fin , which is itself reached after |L| steps. Finally, Section 3.4 and 3.5 of [12] explain how to compute simultaneously optimal strategies for both players. In our context, this allows us to obtain for every valuation ν ∈ [0, r] and location of an r-SPTG, such that Val( , ν) / ∈ {−∞, +∞}, a memoryless optimal strategy for Max, and an optimal switching strategy for Min: a switching strategy is described by a pair (σ 1 Min , σ 2 Min ) of memoryless strategies and a switch threshold K, so that the optimal strategy is obtained by playing σ 1 Min until the value of the current finite play is below K, in which case, we switch to strategy σ 2 Min , that can be taken as an attractor strategy, that only wants to reach a final location.
E.2 Study of the complete value functions: G is finitely optimal
Still for an r-SPTG with only urgent locations, we now study a precise characterisation of the functions We first define the set F G of affine functions over [0, r] as follows:
Observe that this set is finite and that its cardinality is 2|L| 2 Π tr , pseudo-polynomial in the size of G. Moreover, as a direct consequence of Corollary 15, this set contains enough information to compute the value of the game in each possible valuation of the clock, in the following sense:
We compute the set of intersections of two affine functions of F G :
This set is depicted in Figure 8 on an example. Observe that PossCP G contains at most |F G | 2 points since all functions from F G are affine, hence they can intersect at most once with every other function. Thus, the cardinality of PossCP G is 4|L f | 4 (Π tr ) 2 , also bounded by a pseudo-polynomial in the size of G. Moreover, since all functions of F G take rational values in 0 and r ∈ Q, we know that PossCP G ⊆ Q. This set contains all the cutpoints of the value function of G, as shown in Proposition 4.
Notice, that this result allows us to compute Val( ) for every ∈ L. First, we compute the set PossCP G = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y }, which can be done in pseudo-polynomial time in the size of G. Then, for all 1 i , we can compute the vectors Val( , y i ) ∈L of values in each location when the clock takes value y i using Algorithm 1. This provides the value of Val( ) in each cutpoint, for all locations , which is sufficient to characterise the whole value function, as it is continuous and piecewise affine. Observe that all cutpoints, and values in the cutpoints, in the value function are rational numbers, so Algorithm 1 is effective. Thanks to the above discussions, this procedure consists in a pseudo-polynomial number of calls to a pseudo-polynomial algorithm, hence, it runs in pseudo-polynomial time. This allows us to conclude that Val G ( ) is a cost function for all . This proves item (iii) of the definition of finite optimality for SPTGs with only urgent locations Let us conclude the proof that SPTGs are finitely optimal by showing that Min has a fake-optimal NCstrategy, and Max has an optimal FP-strategy. Let ν 1 , ν 2 , . . . , ν k be the sequence of elements from PossCP G in increasing order, and let us assume ν 0 = 0. For all 0 i k let f i be the function from F G that defines the piece of Val G ( ) in the interval [ν i−1 , ν i ] (we have shown above that such an f i always exists). Formally, for all
. Note that all µ i 's are rational values since all ν i 's are. By applying solveInstant in each µ i , we can compute (Val G ( , µ i ) ) ∈L , and we can extract an optimal memoryless strategy σ i Max for Max and an optimal switching strategy σ i Min for Min. Thus we know that, for all ∈ L, playing σ i Min (respectively, σ i Max ) from ( , µ i ) allows Min (respectively, Max) to ensure a cost at most (respectively, at least)
However, it is easy to check that the bound given by f i (µ i ) holds in every valuation, i.e., for all , for all ν
and Val Min can be used to obtain the fake-optimal NC-strategy). The same reasoning applies to strategies of Max and we conclude that Max has an optimal FP-strategy.
F Every SPTG is finitely optimal
We start with an auxiliary lemma showing a property of the rates of change of the value functions associated to non-urgent locations Lemma 17. Let G be an r-SPTG, and be non-urgent locations of Min and Max, respectively. Then for all 0 ν < ν r:
Proof. For the location , the inequality rewrites in
Using the upper definition of the value (thanks to the determinacy result of Theorem 1), it suffices to prove, for all ε > 0, the existence of a strategy σ Min such that for all strategies σ Max of the opponent
The definition of the value implies the existence of a strategy σ Min such that for all strategies σ Max
Then, σ Min can be obtained by playing from ( , ν) , at the first turn, as prescribed by σ Min but delaying ν − ν time units more (that we are allowed to do since is non-urgent), and, for other turns, directly like σ Min . A similar reasoning allows us to obtain the result for .
Then, we observe that the construction of G r does not alter the value of the game:
Now, we turn our attention to the construction of G L ,r . We show that, even if the locations in L are turned into urgent locations, we may still obtain for them a similar result of the rates of change as the one of Lemma 17:
Proof. It suffices to notice that from ( , ν), Min (respectively, Max) may choose to go directly in f ensuring the value (r − ν)π( ) + Val G ( , r).
F.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Let σ Min and σ Max be a fake-optimal NC-strategy of Min and an optimal FP-strategy of Max in G L ∪{ },r , respectively. Notice that both strategies are also well-defined finite positional strategies in G L ,r .
First, let us show that σ Min is indeed an NC-strategy in G L ,r . Take a finite play ( 0 , ν 0 ) We now show the result for ∈ L Min . The proof for ∈ L Max is a straightforward adaptation. Notice that every play in G L ,r that conforms with σ Min is also a play in G L ∪{ },r that conforms with σ Min , as σ Min is defined in G L ∪{ },r and thus plays with no delay in location . Thus, for all ν ∈ [a, r] and ∈ L, by the optimality result of Lemma 3,
To obtain that , ν) , it remains to show the reverse inequality. To that extent, let ρ be a finite play in G L ,r that conforms with σ Max , starts in a configuration ( , ν) with ν ∈ [a, r], and ends in a final location. We show by induction on the length of ρ that Cost(ρ) Val G L ∪{ },r ( , ν) . If ρ has size 1 then is a final configuration and
Otherwise ρ = ( , ν) c − → ρ where ρ is a run that conforms with σ Max , starting in a configuration ( , ν ) and ending in a final configuration. By induction hypothesis, we have Cost(ρ ) Val G L ∪{ },r ( , ν ). We now distinguish three cases, the two first being immediate:
If ∈ L Min , and = or ν = ν, we have that ( , ν)
This concludes the induction. As a consequence,
for all locations and ν ∈ [a, r], which finally proves that Val G L ,r ( , ν) Val G L ∪{ },r ( , ν). Fake-optimality of σ Min over [a, r] in G L ∪{ },r is then obtained by (6).
F.2 Proof that left(r) < r
This lemma allows us to effectively compute left(r): [r , left(r) ] are at least (respectively, at most) −π( ). Hence, this property holds on [r , r] . Then, by applying Proposition 5 |L | times (here, we use the finite optimality of the games ( , ν) . Using Lemma 18, we also know that for all ν r, and ,
We finally prove that left(r) < r. This is immediate in case left(r) = 0, since r > 0. Otherwise, from the result obtained previously, we know that there exists r < left(r), and
From Lemma 19, we also know that Proof. Let σ Min and σ Max be some fake-optimal NC-strategy and optimal FP-strategy in G ,r . As I is a nonsingleton interval, there exists a subinterval I ⊂ I, which is not a singleton and is contained in a interval of σ Min and of σ Max . Let ν ∈ I . As already noticed in the proof of Lemma 8, the play Play(( , ν), σ Min , σ Max ) necessarily reaches a final location and has cost Val G ,r ( , ν) .
Both equations combined imply
be its prefix until the first final location k (the prefix used to compute the cost of the play). We also let ν ∈ I be a valuation such that ν < ν .
Assume by contradiction that there exists an index i such that ν < ν i and let i be the smallest of such indices. For each
As I is contained in an interval of σ Min and σ Max , we have δ = δ and either t = t = 0, or ν + t = ν + t . Applying this result for all j < i, we obtain that
notice moreover that, as before, this prefix has cost Val G ,r ( , ν ). In particular,
which implies that the slope of Val G ,r ( ) is at most −π( ), and therefore contradicts the hypothesis. As a consequence, we have that ν i = ν for all i.
Again by contradiction, assume now that k = f for some ∈ L \ L u . By the same reasoning as before, we then would have
Since σ Min and σ Max are FP-strategies, that play constantly in valuation ν, we know that ( 0 , ν)
The case ∈ L Max : a geometric proof of fi = fj. The dotted lines represents fi and fj, the dashed lines have slope −π( ), and the plain line depicts ValG( , ·). Because the slope of fi is strictly smaller than −π( ), and the value at rj is above the dashed line it can not be the case that fi(rj) = ValG( , rj) = fj(rj).
Notice that the previous developments also show that for all ν ∈ I (here, ν < ν is not needed), Val G ,r ( , ν ) = w + ϕ k (ν ), with the same location k , and weight k. Since this equality holds on I ⊆ I which is not a singleton, and Val G ,r ( ) is affine on I, it holds everywhere on I.
F.4 Proof of Lemma 6
For the first item, we assume ∈ L Min , since the proof of the other case only differ with respect to the sense of the inequalities. From Lemma 20, we know that in G ,ri there exists r < r i+1 such that Val G ,r i ( ) is affine of [r , r i+1 ] and its slope is smaller that −π(
Combining both inequalities allows us to conclude.
We now turn to the proof of the second item, showing the stationarity of sequence (r i ). We consider first the case where ∈ L Max . Let i > 0 such that r i = 0 (if there exist no such i then r 1 = 0). Recall from Lemma 20 that there exists r i < r i such that Val G ,r i−1 ( ) is affine on [r i , r i ], of slope greater than −π( ). In particular,
Since G ,ri−1 is assumed to be finitely optimal, we know that
is a non-urgent location, Lemma 17 ensures that ( ):
Recall that f i has a slope strictly greater that −π( ), therefore f i (r j ) < f i (r i ) + π( )(r i − r j ) f j (r j ). As a consequence f i = f j (this is depicted in Figure 9) . Therefore, there can not be more than |F G | + 1 non-null elements in the sequence r 0 r 1 · · · , which proves that there exists i |F G | + 2 such that r i = 0.
We continue with the case where ∈ L Min . Let r ∞ = inf{r i | i 0}. In this case, we look at the affine parts of Val G ( ) with a slope greater than −π( ), and we show that there can only be finitely many such segment in [r ∞ , 1]. We then show that there is at least one such segment contained in [r i+1 , r i ] for all i, bounding the size of the sequence. To every segment [a, b] with a slope greater than −π( ), we associate a function f [a,b] ∈ F G as follows. Let i be the smallest index such that [a, b] 
Consider now two disjoint segments [a, b] and [c, d] with a slope strictly greater than −π( ), and assume that f [a,b] = f [c,d] (in particular both segments have the same slope). Without loss of generality, assume that b < c. We claim that there exists a segment [e, g] in-between [a, b] and [c, d] with a slope greater than the slope of [c, d] , and that f [e,g] and f [a,b] intersect over [b, c] , in a point of abscisse x, i.e., x ∈ [b, c] verifies f [e,g] Figure 10 ).
Let α be the greatest cutpoint smaller than c. We know that the slope of [α, c] is different from the one of [c, d ]. If it is greater then define e = α and x = g = c, those indeed satisfy the property. If the slope of [α, c] is smaller than the one of [c, d] 
, for all x < ν < c. Finally, let g be the smallest cutpoint of Val G ( ) strictly greater than x, and e the greatest cutpoint of Val G ( ) smaller than or equal to x. By construction [e, g] is a segment that contains x. The slope of the segment [e, g] is s [e,g] 
, and the slope of the segment
, it is indeed the abscisse of the intersection point of f [c,d] = f [a,b] and f [e,g] , which concludes the proof of the previous claim.
For every function f ∈ F G , there are less than |F G | intersection points between f and the other functions of F G (at most one for each pair (f, f )). If f has a slope greater than −π( ), thanks to the previous paragraph, we know that there are at most |F G | segments [a, b] such that f [a,b] = f . Summing over all possible functions f , there are at most |F G | 2 segments with a slope greater than −π( ). Now, we link those segments with the valuations r i 's, for i > 0. By item (i), thanks to the finite-optimality of ( , r i ) . Furthermore, Lemma 8 states that the slope of the segment directly on the left of r i is equal to −π( ). With the previous inequality in mind, this can not be the case if Val G ( ) is affine over the whole interval [r i+1 , r i ]. Thus, there exists a segment [a, b] of slope strictly greater than −π( ) such that b ∈ [r i+1 , r i ]. As we also know that the slope left to r i+1 is −π( ), it must be the case that a ∈ [r i+1 , r i ]. Hence, we have shown that in-between r i+1 and r i , there is always a segment (this is depicted in Figure 11 ). As the number of such segments is bounded by |F G | 2 , we know that the sequence r i
The case ∈ L Min : as the value at ri+1 is strictly below ValG(ri) + π( )(ri − ri+1), as the slope on the left of ri and of ri+1 is −π( ), there must exist a segment (represented with a double line) with slope greater than −π( ) in [ri+1, ri).
is stationary in at most |F G | 2 + 1 steps, i.e., that there exists i |F G | 2 + 1 such that r i = 0.
F.5 Proof of Lemma 8
We denote by r the smallest valuation (smaller than r 1 ) such that for all locations , Val G ( ) is affine over [r , r 1 ]. Then, the proof goes by contradiction: using Lemma 20, we assume that for all have the same behaviour on all valuations of the interval (r , r 1 ), i.e., either always play urgently the same transition, or wait, in a non-urgent location, until reaching some valuation greater than or equal to r 1 and then play the same transition.
Observe is −π( ). Thus for such a location , we know that (i) ∧ ¬(ii) holds for (by letting r be r ).
For other locations , we will construct a new pair of NC-and FP-strategies σ Min and σ Max in G L ,r0 such that for all locations and valuations ν ∈ (r , r 1 )
As a consequence, with Lemma 3 (over game G L ,r0 ), one would have that Val As a consequence of this induction, we have shown that for all ∈ L, and for all ν ∈ (r , r 1 ), fake σ Min G L ,r 0 ( , ν) Val G ( , ν), which shows one inequality of (7), the other being obtained very similarly.
G
Run of the algorithm on an example Figure 12 shows the value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1 . Here is how the algorithm obtains those functions. First it computes the functions at valuation 1, thanks to solveInstant. Then, it computes the value of the game where all states are urgent but additional terminal states have been added by the wait function to allow waiting until 1. This step gives the correct value functions until the cutpoint 3 4 : in the repeat loop, at first a = 9/10 but the slope in 1 is smaller than the slope that would be granted by waiting. Then a = 3/4 where the algorithm gives a slope of value −16 in 2 while the cost of this Max's location is −14. We thus choose r := 3/4 and compute the algorithm on the interval [0, r] with final states allowing one to wait until r and get the already known value in r. The algorithm then stops at 1 2 in order to allow 1 to wait, then in 
H

Reset-acyclic PTGs
Towards solving reset-acyclic PTGs, our first step is to remove strict guards from the transitions, i.e., guards of the form (a, b] , [b, a) 
where: It is easy to verify that, in all configurations (( , {M k }), ν) reachable from the null valuation, the valuation ν is M k . More interestingly, in all configurations (( , (M k , M k+1 )), ν) reachable from the null valuation, the valuation ν is in [M k , M k+1 ]: indeed if ν = M k (respectively, M k+1 ), it intuitively simulates a configuration of the original game with a valuation arbitrarily close to M k , but greater than M k (respectively, smaller than M k+1 ). The game can thus take transitions with guard x > M k , but can not take transitions with guard x = M k anymore.
Lemma 22. Let G be a one-clock PTG, and G be its region-PTG defined as before. For ( , I) ∈ L × Reg G and ν ∈ I, Val G ( , ν) = Val G (( , I), ν) . Moreover, we can transform an ε-optimal strategy of G into a ε -optimal strategy of G with ε > ε.
Proof. The proof consists in replacing strategies of G where players can play on the borders of regions, by strategies of G that play increasingly close to the border as time passes. If played close enough, the loss created can be chosen as small as we want.
Consider now the region-PTG G associated to a reset-acyclic PTG (and of polynomial size with respect to the original PTG). We can decompose the graph of G into strongly connected components (that do not contain reset transitions by hypothesis). Consider first its bottom strongly connected components, i.e., components with no reset transitions exiting from them. All clock constraints are of the form [a, b] with a < b, or {a}. We denote by 0 = M 0 < M 1 < · · · < M K the constants appearing in the guards of the component (adding 0). Then, solving the component amounts to (i) solve the sub-game with only transitions with guard {M k }, replacing then these transitions by final locations with the cost just computed, (ii) solve the modified sub-game with only transitions with guard [M k−1 , M k ], by first shrinking the guards to transform the game into an SPTG, and so on, until M 0 = 0. Once all bottom strongly connected components are solved, we replace the reset transitions going to them by final locations again, using the cost computed so far. We continue until no strongly connected components remain. Each SPTG being solvable in exponential time, the overall reset-acyclic can be solved in exponential time too.
